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Hypothetico-Deductivism is Still Hopeless


Since Christensen refuted the Bootstrap theory of confirmation in 1990, there have been some trials to improve the Hypothetico-Deductive theory of confirmation. After some trials, Gemes (1998) declared that his revised version completely overcame the difficulties of Hypothetico-Deductivism without generating any new difficulties. In this paper, I will assert that Gemes's revised version encounters some new difficulties, so it cannot be a true alternative to the Bootstrap theory of confirmation and to classical Hypothetico-Deductivism. Also I will assert that, in principle, such new difficulties cannot be overcome by any trials dependent only on formal logic.

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Park, SJ. Hypothetico-Deductivism is Still Hopeless. Erkenntnis 60, 229–234 (2004).

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  • Formal Logic
  • True Alternative
  • Bootstrap Theory