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Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms

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Abstract

This paper deals with a cognitivist approach to the problem of how social and economic institutions are formed. The economic framework I use is Simon's model of procedural rationality, integrating a cognitivist approach into a game structure. In game theory norms are seen as conventions, but not all institutions can be explained by game theory models. In cognition-based approaches, the creation and maintenance of institutions is the outcome of a search for satisficing norms. According to Simon and Newell (1972), agents faced with problems to solve visualise a problem as an area of potential situations to examine in order to establish analogical problem structures. In my approach, a norm can be defined within a system of norms that form in a historical-evolutionary dimension, suggesting a path in norm-forming processes.

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  1. Department of Economic Sciences, University of Padova, via del Santo 33, 35123, Padova, Italy

    Maurizio Mistri

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Mistri, M. Procedural Rationality and Institutions: The Production of Norms by Means of Norms. Constitutional Political Economy 14, 301–317 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:COPE.0000003860.57642.fb

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