, Volume 18, Issue 3, pp 279–293

Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View

  • Jonathan E. Adler

DOI: 10.1023/B:ARGU.0000046716.23529.a5

Cite this article as:
Adler, J.E. Argumentation (2004) 18: 279. doi:10.1023/B:ARGU.0000046716.23529.a5


Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the “dialectical tier“ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson 's dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a social-epistemic activity.

aims of argument argumentation as a social-epistemic practice costs of inquiry demandingness dialectical tier division of epistemic labor duty to respond to objections economize feasibility Ralph Johnson rational persuasion second-order reasons 

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan E. Adler
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBrooklyn College and the Graduate SchoolBrooklynU.S.A

Personalised recommendations