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On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural Classification of Arguments

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Abstract

We develop conceptions of arguments and of argument types that will, by serving as the basis for developing a natural classification of arguments, benefit work in artificial intelligence. Focusing only on arguments construed as the semantic entities that are the outcome of processes of reasoning, we outline and clarify our view that an argument is a proposition that represents a fact as both conveying some other fact and as doing so wholly. Further, we outline our view that, with respect to arguments that are propositions, (roughly) two arguments are of the same type if and only if they represent the same relation of conveyance and do so in the same way. We then argue for our conceptions of arguments and argument types, and compare them to alternative positions. We also illustrate the need for, and some of the strengths of, our approach to classifying arguments through an examination of aspects of two prominent and recent attempts to classify arguments using argumentation schemes, namely those of M. Kienpointner and D. Walton. Finally, we clarify how our conception of arguments and of argument types can assist in developing an exhaustive classification of arguments.

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Katzav, J., Reed, C.A. On Argumentation Schemes and the Natural Classification of Arguments. Argumentation 18, 239–259 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ARGU.0000024044.34360.82

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ARGU.0000024044.34360.82

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