Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 121–155

Economic Analyses of Mergers at the FTC: The Cruise Ships Mergers Investigation

  • Mary T. Coleman
  • David W. Meyer
  • David T. Scheffman
Article

Abstract

This paper provides an overview of how economists atthe Federal Trade Commission assess the potentialcompetitive effects of mergers, with a focus on thetypes of quantitative analyses frequently employed.The paper first outlines the general approach employedat the Federal Trade Commission to review mergers.The paper then describes analyses done in theinvestigation of proposed mergers in the cruiseline industry as a specific example. Of particularinterest in this example are the analyses used toassess the potential for coordinated interaction asa result of the merger.

Antitrust FTC mergers competitive analysis 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mary T. Coleman
    • 1
  • David W. Meyer
    • 1
  • David T. Scheffman
    • 1
  1. 1.LECGLLPU.S.A

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