Abstract
In this paper, we highlight the factorswhich influence governments in theirdecision to implement environmentalpolicies of varying degrees of severity. Wesubstantiate our arguments with analyticalevidence from the public interest theoryand the economic theory of regulation(``interest group theory''). We show, throughempirical analysis based on the policies of22 OECD countries, that pressure groupshave sufficient impact on environmentalregulation so that the economic theorypredominates over the public interesttheory.
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Tanguay, G.A., Lanoie, P. & Moreau, J. Environmental Policy, Public Interest and Political Market. Public Choice 120, 1–27 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000035853.67029.7e
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:PUCH.0000035853.67029.7e