Experimental Economics

, Volume 7, Issue 3, pp 217–234 | Cite as

Charitable Lottery Structure and Fund Raising: Theory and Evidence

  • Donald J. Dale


Do fixed-prize charitable lotteries generate more net revenue than do revenue-dependent lotteries? I present the results of an experiment designed to test a theoretical prediction of the relationship between the prize structure of a lottery funding a public good and individuals' participation in the lottery. I find that a fixed-prize lottery configuration induces significantly greater participation and a significantly higher level of public good funding than does a revenue-dependent lottery.


Public Good Economic Theory Theoretical Prediction Public Finance Great Participation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Donald J. Dale
    • 1
  1. 1.Muhlenberg CollegeUSA

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