Skip to main content
Log in

Understanding the Transaction Costs of Transition: it's the Culture, Stupid

  • Published:
The Review of Austrian Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The process of transition in Central and Eastern Europe from socialism to capitalism is a cultural issue rather than a mere technical one. To support this proposition, economic analysis must explain why and how informal rules affect the results of transition.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alesina, A. and Angeletos, G. (2002) “Fairness and Redistribution: US vs. Europe.” National Bureau for Economic Research, Working Paper 9502.

  • Anderson, T. and Hill, P. (1983) “Privatizing the Commons: An Improvement.” Southern Economic Journal, 50: 438–450.

    Google Scholar 

  • Barro, R. (2000) “Rule of Law, Democracy, and Economic Performance.” In: O'Driscoll, G., Holmes, K., and Kirkpatrick, M. (Eds.) 2000 Index of Economic Freedom. Heritage Foundation.

  • Benacek, V. (2002) “The Czech Generic Private Sector in Transition: Developments and Their Impact on National Economy.” Unpublished manuscript.

  • Buchanan, J. (1972) “Politics, Property, and the Law.” Journal of Law and Economics, 15: 451–452.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, J. (1975) Freedom in Constitutional Contract. Texas A&M University Press, pp. 46–47.

  • Buchanan, J. (1976) “General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics.” Paper presented at The Conference on Subjectivism in Economics. Dallas, Texas.

  • Buchanan, J. (1993) Property as a Guarantor of Liberty. Edward Elgar.

  • Colombatto, E. (2001) “The Concept of Transition.” Journal of Markets and Morality, 4: 269–288.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colombatto, E. and Macey, J. (1997) “Lessons from Transition in Eastern Europe: A Property Rights Interpretation.” Journal for Institutional Innovation, Development and Transition, 1: 10–17.

    Google Scholar 

  • Djankov, S. et al. (2000) The Regulation of Entry. NBER Working Paper 7892, pp. 1–26.

  • 1Economic Freedom in the World (2000) Fraser Institute.

  • Ellickson, R. (1986) “Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County.” Stanford Law Review, 38: 624–687.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gellner, E. (1988) Plough, Book and Sword. London: Collins Harvill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haan, J. and Sturm, J. (2000) “On the Relationship between Economic Freedom and Economic Growth.” European Journal of Political Economy, 16: 215–241.

    Google Scholar 

  • 2Index of Economic Freedom (2002) Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation.

  • Laki, M. (2002) “The Performance of Newly Established Private Firms: The Case of Hungary.” Unpublished manuscript.

  • Libecap, G. (1996) “Economic Variables and the Development of the Law; The Case of Western Mineral Rights.” In: Alston, L., Eggertsson, T., and North D. (Eds.) Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, p. 57. Cambridge University Press.

  • Manne, H. (1997) “The Judiciary and Free Markets.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 21: 11–37.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milovanovich, M. (2002) “Endogenous Corruption in Privatized Companies.” Unpublished manuscript.

  • North, D. (1986) “Institutions, Economic Growth and Freedom: A Historical Perspective.” In: Walker, M. (Ed.) Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare. Fraser Institute, pp. 14–19.

  • North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press.

  • Pejovich, S. (1993) “Institutions, Nationalism, and the Transition Process in Eastern Europe.” In: Paul, E. (Ed.) Social Philosophy and Policy: Liberalism and the Economic Order, pp. 68–74. Cambridge University Press.

  • Pejovich, S. (1994) “The Market for Institutions vs. Capitalism by Fiat: The Case of Eastern Europe.” Kyklos, 47: 527–528.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pejovich, S. (Ed.) (2001) The Economics of Property Rights, Vol. 2, part IV. Edward Elgar.

  • Pekich, B. (1990) Godine Koje su Skakavci Pojeli (Years the Grasshoppers Ate). Belgrade.

  • Posner, R. (1995) Overcoming Law, p. 183. Harvard University Press.

  • Stigler, G. (1971) “The Theory of Government Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics, 2: 3–21.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sunstein, C. (1993) “On Property and Constitutionalism.” Cardozo Law Review, 14: 907–935.

    Google Scholar 

  • Torstensson, J. (1994) “Property Rights and Economic Growth: An Empirical Study.” Kyklos, 47: 231–247.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tasich, S. (2002) “Kampanja za Prikupljanje Poreza” (Tax Collecting Campaign), Short Studies, Free Market Center in Belgrade.

  • Wallis, J. and North, D. (1986) “Measuring the Transaction Sector in the United States Economy, 1870-1970.” In: Engerman, S. and Gallman, R. (Eds.) Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth. Chicago University Press, pp. 95–161.

  • Winiecki, J. (2002) “The New Entrepreneurial Private Sector in Transition and Economic Performance.” Unpublished manuscript.

  • Winiecki, J. (2002) “The Polish Generic Private Sector in Transition: Development and Characteristics.” Unpublished manuscript.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Pejovich, S.(. Understanding the Transaction Costs of Transition: it's the Culture, Stupid. The Review of Austrian Economics 16, 347–361 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027397122301

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1027397122301

Navigation