Abstract
The framework of public decisions, and particularly the provision of law, is seen here as an agency contract. What distinguishes this contract is the nature of the right delegated to the agent: The capacity to make law gives the opportunity to take advantage of the incompleteness of the constitutional contract. The agency relationship may be loosened or even reversed. This article tries to draw some lessons from the English and American history in that matter and applies them to the making of the future European State.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Ackerman, Bruce. (1998). We the People. vol. 1, Foundations, Cambridge, MA: Bellknap Press (5th. edition).
Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean. (1997). “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations.” Journal of Political Economy. 105, 1–29.
Anderson, Terry L. & Hill, Peter J. (1986). “Constraining the Transfer Society: Constitutional and Moral Dimensions.” Cato Journal. 6, 317–341.
Anderson, Terry L. & Hill, Peter J. (1999). “Institutional Entrepreneurship in the not so Wild, Wild West.” Mimeo, paper presented at the 12th Maastricht workshop in Law and Economics, 23 p.
Aranson, Peter C. (1990). “The European Economic Community. Lessons from America.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines. 2, 473–496.
Barzel, Yoram. (1997a). “Property Rights and the Evolution of the State.” University of Washington, mimeo.
Barzel, Yoram. (1997b). “Parliament as a Wealth-Maximizing Institution. The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote.” International Review of Law and Economics. 17, 455–474.
Barzel, Yoram & Kiser, Edgar. (1997). “The Development and Decline of Voting Medieval Institutions. A Comparison of England and France.” Economic Inquiry. 35, 244–260.
Beard, Charles. A. (1913). An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, New York: MacMillan.
Buchanan, James M. & Tullock, Gordon. (1962). The Calculus of Consent, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Buchanan, James M. (1988). “Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect.” In J. D. Gwartney & R. E. Wagner eds., Public Choice and Constitutional Economics, Greenwich, London: Jai Press, 131–137.
Burley, A.-M. & Mattli, W. (1993). “Europe Before the Court. A Political Theory of Legal Integration.” International Organisation. 47, 41–76.
Cooter, Robert. (forthcoming). The Strategic Constitution, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cooter, Robert & Drexl, Josef. (1994). “The Logic of Power in the Emerging European Constitution: Game Theory and the Division of Powers.” International Review of Law and Economics. 14, 307–326.
Cooter, Robert & Ginsburg, Tom. (1999). “Division of Powers in the European Constitution.” In Peter Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law.
Corbett, R. (1994). “Representing the People.” In Andrew Duff, John Pinder & Roy Pryce (eds.), Maastricht and Beyond. Building the European Union, London: Routledge, 207–228.
Currie, David P. (1994). “The Constitution in Congress. Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789–1791.” The University of Chicago Law Review. 61, 775–865.
Garrett, Geoffrey. (1992). “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The EC's Internal Market.” International Organization, 46, 533–560.
Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D. (1986). “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration.” Journal of Political Economy. 94, 691–719.
Hamilton, A. (1987). Federalist Papers, edited by Isaac Kramnick, New York: Penguin Books.
Harnay, Sophie. (1999). Economie Positive de la Justice Administrative, Ph.D., Paris.
Harnay, Sophie & Vigouroux, Isabelle. (1999). “L'indépendance du Juge: Qualité de la décision judiciaire en présence d'asymétries informationnelles.” Revue Internationale de Droit Economique. 13, 185–205.
Hogue, Arthur. (1985). Origins of the Common Law, Indianapolis: Liberty Press (1st ed., 1966).
Holcombe, Randall G. (1991). “Constitutions as Constraints. A Case Study of Three American Constitutions.” Constitutional Political Economy. 2, 303–328.
Holcombe, Randall G. (1992). “The Distributive Model of Government. Evidence from the Confederate Constitutions.” Southern Economic Journal. 53, 762–779.
Holcombe, Randall G. (1998). “Constitution Theory and the Constitutional History of Colonial America.” The Independant Review. A Journal of Political Economy. 3, 21–36.
Josselin, Jean-Michel & Marciano, Alain. (1995). “Constitutionalism and Common Knowledge: Assessment and Application to the Design of a Future European Constitution.” Public Choice. 85, 177–185.
Josselin, Jean-Michel & Marciano, Alain. (1997). “The Paradox of Leviathan. How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?” European Journal of Law and Economics. 4, 5–21.
Josselin, Jean-Michel & Marciano, Alain. (1999). “Administrative Law and Economics.” In Jurgen Backhaus (ed.), Elgar Companion to Law and Economics, Cheltenham, 115–120.
Josselin, Jean-Michel & Marciano, Alain. (forthcoming). “Normative Public Decisions and the Scottish Enlightenment.” Journal of Economic Studies.
Kalt, J. P. & Zupan, Mark A. (1984). “Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics.” American Economic Review. 74, 279–300.
Kau, J. B. & Rubin, Paul H. (1979). “Self-Interest, Ideology and Logrolling in Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law and Economics. 22, 365–384.
Kehoane, Robert O. & Hofmann, Stanley. (1991). “Institutional Change in Europe since the 1980's.” In Robert O. Kehoane & Stanley Hofmann eds., The New European Community, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
McGuire, Robert A. (1988). “Constitution Making. A Rational Choice Model of the Federal Convention of 1787.” American Journal of Political Science. 32, 483–522.
McGuire, Robert A. & Ohsfeldt, Robert A. (1986). “An Economic Model of Voting Behaviour over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.” Journal of Economic History. 46, 79–111.
McGuire, Robert A. & Ohsfeldt, Robert L. (1989). “Self-Interest, Agency Theory and Political Voting Behaviour. The Ratification of the United States Constitution.” American Economic Review. 79, 219–234.
Merville, Larry J. & Osborne, Dale K. (1990). “Constitutional Democracy and the Theory of Agency.” Constitutional Political Economy. 1, 21–47.
Milsom, S. F. C. (1969). Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London: Butterworths.
Nozick, Robert. (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
Ostrom, Vincent. (1987). The Political Theory of the Compound Republic, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Peltzman, Sam. (1984). “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting.” Journal of Law and Economics. 27, 181–210.
Peltzman, Sam. (1985). “An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century.” American Economic Review. 75, 656–675.
Petite, Michel. (1989). “Les lobbies européens.” Pouvoir. 48, 95–103.
Pigou, Alfred C. (1952). The Economics of Welfare, Londres: MacMillan (5ème ed).
Pollock, F. & Maitland, F. W. (1968). The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Qian, Yingyi & Weingast, Barry R. (1997). “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 11, 83–92.
Sherry, Suzanna. (1987). “The Founder's Unwritten Constitution.” The University of Chicago Law Review. 54, 1127–1177.
Stigler, George J. (1985). “The Origins of the Sherman Act.” Journal of Legal Studies. 1, 1–12.
Stone Sweet, Alec & Brunell, Thomas L. (1998). “The European Court and the National Courts. A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961–1995.” Jean Monnet Working Papers, Yale Law School.
Stone Sweet, Alec & Caporaso, James A. (1998). “La Cour de Justice et L'intégration Européenne.” Revue Française de Science Politique. 48, 195–244.
Tullock, Gordon. (1965). “Constitutional Mythology.” New Individualist Review. 3, 13–17.
Tullock, Gordon. (1988). “Why Did the Industrial Revolution Occur in England?” In Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking, Boston: Kluwer, 409–419.
Wagner, Richard E. (1988). “Agency, Economic Calculation and Constitutional Construction.” In Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking, Boston: Kluwer, 423–445.
Wagner, Richard E. (1993). “Parchment, Guns and the Maintenance of Constitutional Contract.” Shafestbury Papers 3, Aldershot: Elgar.
Witt, Ulrich. (1992). “The Emergence of a Protective Agency and the Constitutional Dilemma.” Constitutional Political Economy. 3, 255–266.
Yandle, Bruce. (1991). “Organic Constitutions and Common Law.” Constitutional Political Economy. 2, 225–241.
Yandle, Bruce. (1993). “Sir Edward Coke and the Struggle for a New Constitutional Order.” Constitutional Political Economy. 4, 263–285.
Zupan, Mark. (1987). “The Apparent Ideological Behaviour of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions.” Working Paper #87–15, School of Business Administration, University of Southern California.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Josselin, JM., Marciano, A. Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe. European Journal of Law and Economics 10, 217–233 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026543414937
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026543414937