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Reputation Without Repeated Interaction: A Role for Public Disclosures

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Abstract

This paper conductsan experiment to investigate the economic effect of public disclosureswithin a multi-move adaptation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.The game, which has multiple equilibria, is characterized by:(1) a stochastic endpoint, (2) random, repeated pairings withanonymous partners, and (3) public disclosures concerning thecurrent partner's previous strategies. In the experiment, cooperationis improved by the disclosures. In addition, subjects cooperatemore frequently when encountering a player who has tended tocooperate in the past, and less frequently when encounteringa player who has tended to defect in the past. Delayed disclosureleads to levels of cooperation only slightly less than thoseobtained with timely disclosure.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Binghamton University, USA

    Steven T. Schwartz

  2. The Ohio State University, USA

    Richard A. Young & Kristina Zvinakis

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  1. Steven T. Schwartz
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  2. Richard A. Young
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  3. Kristina Zvinakis
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Schwartz, S.T., Young, R.A. & Zvinakis, K. Reputation Without Repeated Interaction: A Role for Public Disclosures. Review of Accounting Studies 5, 351–375 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026501807727

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