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Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions

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Bar-On, D., Horisk, C. & Lycan, W.G. Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101, 1–28 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026463916160

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