Abstract
This paper proposes and analyzes a model of how the behaviorof voters and that of potential party activists togetherdetermine party membership and the ideological characteristicsof party platforms. Membership decisions are based onexpressive motivations, whereas platforms are chosenstrategically. Part of the ideological spectrum may remainoutside both parties because of alienation or indifference.
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Poutvaara, P. Party Platforms with Endogenous Party Membership. Public Choice 117, 79–98 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026169716399
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026169716399