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Social Utility in Ultimatum Bargaining

Abstract

In this article we will provide an overview of factors that influence the weight that self-interest and equity related motives receive in ultimatum bargaining. These factors are grouped into three main categories: factors relating to the context of the game, factors relating to the parties involved, and factors related to characteristics of the game. Results of the studies are discussed in relation to the concept of social utility. The authors point out possible omissions in the literature—especially the lack of interest for the behavior of recipients—and recommend directions for future research.

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Correspondence to Michel J. J. Handgraaf.

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Handgraaf, M.J.J., Van Dijk, E. & De Cremer, D. Social Utility in Ultimatum Bargaining. Social Justice Research 16, 263–283 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025940829543

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025940829543

  • ultimatum game
  • social utility
  • fairness
  • equity
  • self-interest