Abstract
This paper addresses the potential for conflict between antitrust authorities in the arena of merger control in the new economy. By “new economy” we mean two related developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the ability to sell and produce products world-wide, and secondly, markets with certain characteristics such as network effects and other aspects of natural monopoly. We focus on three types of substantive issues in merger control – market definition, assessment of competitive effects, and the role of remedies. We argue that the scope for conflict varies significantly across these three arenas. In particular, conflict over market definition is less likely. By contrast, the assessment of competitive effects and the role of remedies are areas where conflict between antitrust authorities may be more likely in “new economy-type” markets.
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Röller, LH., Wey, C. Merger Control in the New Economy. NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking 5, 5–20 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024998218643
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024998218643