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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 115, Issue 1, pp 81–97 | Cite as

Knowing Facts and Believing Propositions: A Solution to the Problem of Doxastic Shift

  • Marc A. Moffett
Article

Abstract

The Problem of Doxastic Shift may be stated as a dilemma: on the one hand, the distribution of nominal complements of the form `the ψ that p’ strongly suggests that `that’-clauses cannot be univocally assigned propositionaldenotations; on the other hand, facts about quantification strongly suggest that `that’-clauses must be assigned univocal denotations. I argue that the Problem may be solved by defining the extension of a proposition to be a set of facts or, more generally, conditions. Given this, the logical operation of descriptive predication can be introduced in a way that resolves the dilemma withoutsacrificing the singular term analysis of `that’-clauses.

Keywords

Logical Operation Singular Term Term Analysis Descriptive Predication 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marc A. Moffett
    • 1
  1. 1.University of WyomingLaramieUSA

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