Abstract
In Why pains are not mental objects (1998) Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of experiencebecome a mental object. I shall finally argue that, thoughextreme pains cannot serve as paradigm cases, they do showthe general importance of taking pain states to be objects.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
REFERENCES
Douglas, G. (1998): ‘Why Pains are not Mental Objects’, Philosophical Studies 91(2), 127–148.
Gillet, C.R. (1991): ‘The Neurophilosophy of Pain’, Philosophy 66(255), 191–206.
Grahek, N. (1995): ‘The Sensory Dimension of Pain’, Philosophical Studies 79, 167–184.
Grahek, N. (2001): Feeling Pain and Being in Pain, Oldenburg: Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Universität Oldenburg.
Hardcastle, V.G. (1997): ‘When a Pain is not’, The Journal of Philosophy XCIV(8), 381–409.
Langsam, R. (1995): ‘Why Pains are Mental Objects’, in The Journal of Philosophy XCII(6), 303–313.
Melzack, R. (1998): ‘Pain’, in R.L. Gregory (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Mind (pp. 574–575), Oxford: University Press.
Melzack, R. and Katz, J. (1994): ‘Pain Measurement in Persons in Pain’, in P.D. Wall and R. Melzack (eds.), Textbook of Pain (pp. 337–357), Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone.
Nelkin, N. (1986): ‘Pains and Pain Sensations’, The Journal of Philosophy LXXXIII(3), 129–148.
Olivier, A. (2002): ‘When Pain Becomes Unreal’, Philosophy Today 2(46), 113–131.
Sartre, J-P. (1957): ‘The Wall’, in W. Kaufman (ed.), Existentialism, London: Meridian Books.
Sartre, J-P. (1961): The Psychology of Imagination, New York: Citadel Press.
Scarry, E. (1985): The Body in Pain. The Making and Unmaking of the World, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wall, P.D. (1994): ‘The Placedo and the Placedo Response’, in P.D. Wall and R. Melzack (ed.), Textbook of Pain (pp. 297–1308), Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone.
Wall, P. (2000): Pain: The Science of suffering, New York: Columbia University Press.
Wiesel, E. (1982): Night, New York: Bantam Books.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Olivier, A. When Pains are Mental Objects. Philosophical Studies 115, 33–53 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024919818322
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024919818322