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The Political Entrepreneur and the Coordination of the Political Process: A Market Process Perspective of the Political Market

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Abstract

The aim of this article is to apply the Austrian analysis of the entrepreneur to the political process. By distinguishing the political process from the economic process, we will endeavour to show to what extent an analysis in terms of the political market process is both possible and relevant. The existence of an information conveyance which can be assimilated to a price system within the political process, with its resulting profits, are motivating elements for the political entrepreneur. The political entrepreneur is doubly specialised and possesses all the Kirznerian functions of the Austrian entrepreneur as a coordinating agent for the political process.

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François, A. The Political Entrepreneur and the Coordination of the Political Process: A Market Process Perspective of the Political Market. The Review of Austrian Economics 16, 153–168 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024588606724

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