Abstract
I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism.
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Chappell, T. Practical rationality for pluralists about the good. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6, 161–177 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024472726317
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024472726317