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The Tax Revolt and Electoral Competition

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Abstract

This paper explores the effect of electoral competition onstate and local expenditures in the US during the politicalenvironment following the tax revolt of the late 1970s. Itutilizes a theoretical model in which both electoralcompetition and tax and expenditure limits impact spending.Empirical results indicate the tax revolt's primary impact wastransmitted through political candidate competition, notthrough the adoption of tax or expenditure limitations, as iscommonly believed. However, tax and expenditure limits doaffect public education expenditures.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, 23187, U.S.A.

    Samuel H. Baker

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  1. Samuel H. Baker
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Baker, S.H. The Tax Revolt and Electoral Competition. Public Choice 115, 333–345 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024284231329

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