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Public Choice

, Volume 116, Issue 1–2, pp 185–204 | Cite as

Political Competition and Pork-Barrel Politics in the Allocation of Public Investment in Mexico

  • Joan Costa-i-Font
  • Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia
  • Dario Lunapla
Article

Abstract

This paper examines theeffect of political competition in localelections in regional allocation of publicinvestment. The study employs data onMexican elections covering the period 1990–95, characterisedby an increase in electoral competition and coupled withincreasing demands for decentralisationthroughout the states. Empirical evidencesupports the hypothesis that regionalallocation of public investment by centralgovernment was driven by `politicalopportunism' and `local pork-barrelpolitics'. A positive relationship wasfound between the regional allocation ofpublic investment and support for thecentral ruling party. This might indicatethat local spending inefficiencies werepartially explained by the specific supportfor the incumbent party.

Keywords

Positive Relationship Public Finance Public Investment Political Competition Electoral Competition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joan Costa-i-Font
    • 1
    • 3
  • Eduardo Rodriguez-Oreggia
    • 1
    • 2
  • Dario Lunapla
    • 4
  1. 1.London School of EconomicsLondonU.K.
  2. 2.Interamerican Conference on Social SecurityMexico
  3. 3.Departament de Teoria EconòmicaUniversitat de BarcelonaSpain
  4. 4.Secretaría HaciendaMéxico D.FMéxico

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