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Lynch, M.P., Glasgow, J.M. The Impossibility of Superdupervenience. Philosophical Studies 113, 201–221 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024037729994
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024037729994