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Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust

Constitutional Political Economy volume 14, pages 119–140 (2003)Cite this article

Abstract

This paper outlines the relevance of rules to understand tax morale. It tries to find explanations why taxpayers obey, rather than simply evade taxes. The development of a typology of taxpayers shows that the same tax rules can have different compliance effects. Furthermore, the paper provides evidence with two data sets, the World Values Survey and the Taxpayers Opinion Survey that trust in public officials and the legal system have a significant positive effect on tax morale.

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  1. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ), University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland

    Benno Torgler

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Torgler, B. Tax Morale, Rule-Governed Behaviour and Trust. Constitutional Political Economy 14, 119–140 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023643622283

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