Abstract
Buchanan and Tullock's original trade-off model of constitutional design is used to analyze how constitutional design affects post-constitutional rent seeking, and, in turn, how the anticipation of post-constitution rent seeking should lead to modification of constitutional design — specifically with respect to imposing and maintaining effective (composite) supermajority decision rules.
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Spindler, Z.A., De Vanssay, X. Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited. Constitutional Political Economy 14, 95–105 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023639521374
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023639521374