Abstract
If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of sentences has not been developed very far. By introducing possible-worlds semantics for the language of arithmetic plus the unary predicate □, we tackle both problems. Given a frame <W,R> consisting of a set W of worlds and a binary relation R on W, we investigate whether we can interpret □ at every world in such a way that □⌜A⌝ holds at a world w∈W if and only if A holds at every world v∈W such that wRv. The arithmetical vocabulary is interpreted by the standard model at every world. Several ‘paradoxes’ (like Montague's Theorem, Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, McGee's Theorem on the ω-inconsistency of certain truth theories, etc.) show that many frames, e.g., reflexive frames, do not allow for such an interpretation. We present sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a suitable interpretation of □ at any world. Sound and complete semi-formal systems, corresponding to the modal systems K and K4, for the class of all possible-worlds models for predicates and all transitive possible-worlds models are presented. We apply our account also to nonstandard models of arithmetic and other languages than the language of arithmetic.
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Halbach, V., Leitgeb, H. & Welch, P. Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32, 179–223 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023080715357
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1023080715357