Abstract
This paper argues against minimalism about truth. It does so by way of acomparison of the theory of truth with the theory of sets, and considerationof where paradoxes may arise in each. The paper proceeds by asking twoseemingly unrelated questions. First, what is the theory of truth about?Answering this question shows that minimalism bears important similaritiesto naive set theory. Second, why is there no strengthened version ofRussell's paradox, as there is a strengthened Liar paradox? Answering thisquestion shows that like naive set theory, minimalism is unable to makeadequate progress in resolving the paradoxes, and must be replaced by adrastically different sort of theory. Such a theory, it is shown, must befundamentally non-minimalist.
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Glanzberg, M. Minimalism and Paradoxes. Synthese 135, 13–36 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022999315312
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022999315312