Argumentation

, Volume 17, Issue 1, pp 35–42

Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments? (Dedicated to the Memory of R.M. Chisholm, 1916–1999)

  • Mark T. Nelson
Article

Abstract

Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false.

Factual premises moral conclusions moral knowledge valid arguments 

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark T. Nelson
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LeedsLeedsU.K.

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