Abstract
The ``Law of 1/n'' postulates a positive relationship betweenthe number of democratically electedrepresentative districts and governmentspending. Strong support for thisrelationship exists in legislatures in theUnited States (at both the state andnational level) and across countries. Fewstudies have examined this relationship atthe local level despite the fact that localgovernments operate under constraintssimilar to those faced by representativelegislatures. Using a sample of Georgiacounties we find the number of countycommissioners to be positively correlatedwith county government expenditures,indicating support for the Law of 1/nat the local level.
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Bradbury, J.C., Stephenson, E.F. Local Government Structure and Public Expenditures. Public Choice 115, 185–198 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022857028836
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022857028836