Abstract
This paper introduces alternative measures of net budgetallocation and legislative representation. They are neutral tothe size of total expenditure and tax collection as well as tochanges in the population and the size of the legislature,which makes them suitable for panel data exercises andinternational comparative studies. Regression analyses of 50U.S. states and 47 Japanese prefectures using these indiceshighlight similarities and differences in public resourceallocation between respective democracies that reflect theirpolitical and electoral systems.
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Kawaura, A. Public Resource Allocation and Electoral Systems in the U.S. and Japan. Public Choice 115, 63–81 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022841703429
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022841703429