Abstract
This paper develops a model of a two-candidate election inwhich the candidates are mainly office-motivated but also tosome (arbitrarily small) extent policy-motivated, and theirchosen platforms are to some (arbitrarily small) extent noisy.The platforms' being noisy means that if a candidate haschosen a particular platform, the voter's perception is thatshe has, with positive probability, actually chosen some otherplatform. It is shown that (i) an equilibrium in which thecandidates play pure exists whether or not there is aCondorcet winner among the policy alternatives, and (ii) inthis equilibrium the candidates choose their own favoriteplatforms, which means that the platforms do not converge.
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Lagerlöf, J. Policy-Motivated Candidates, Noisy Platforms, and Non-Robustness. Public Choice 114, 319–347 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022637701978
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022637701978