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Are Preferences for Fiscal Discipline Endogenous

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Abstract

Differences in voters' fiscal preferencesare examined taking advantage of theexceptional Swiss institutional setting.Empirical evidence suggests thatpreferences are determined by strictlycultural patterns (cultural area measuredby language). Thus, fiscal preferences canbe considered as being largely exogenous.This implies that, except for specialcases, it is not possible to find simpleproxy variables for fiscal preferences. Anad hoc index of fiscal preferencesought to be built up when the introductionof this variable is required forcomprehensive explanatory models of fiscaldiscipline or for other related studies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Navarre, 31080, Pamplona, Spain

    Francesc Pujol

  2. Department of Economics, University of Geneva, Bd Pont d'Arve 40, CH-1211, Geneva 4, Switzerland

    Luc Weber

Authors
  1. Francesc Pujol
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  2. Luc Weber
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Pujol, F., Weber, L. Are Preferences for Fiscal Discipline Endogenous. Public Choice 114, 421–444 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022633632079

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022633632079

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