Abstract
This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has theresources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussioncenters on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one isincorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesn’t statea fact about truth, it needn’t be explained by deflationists. If itdoes, it can be explained.
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McGrath, M. Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth. Philosophical Studies 112, 47–67 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022542710305
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022542710305