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A Philosophy for the Social Sciences: Realism, Pragmatism, or neither?

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Abstract

Philosophers of science seek to discover theessential features of science. Having donethis, these features are then proffered as a`benchmark' against which any putative sciencecan be assessed for its scientificity. Socialscientists, in particular, are much concernedwith achieving the status of genuine science.When considering the status of the socialsciences, philosophers of science also seek todiscern the essential, and differentiating,characteristics of the object of study, namely,social phenomena as such. This paper provides acritical examination of two apparentlydiametrically opposed approaches to philosophyof science, namely, realism and pragmatism. Thestance of `immanent critique' is adopted. Thisstance seeks to evaluate the success of aphilosophical programme entirely by thestandards that are internal to that programme.The conclusion reached, from this point ofview, is that realism is unrealistic, andpragmatism lacks practical utility.

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Pleasants, N. A Philosophy for the Social Sciences: Realism, Pragmatism, or neither?. Foundations of Science 8, 69–87 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022441619760

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