Abstract
The threat of future entry affects the exploitation of common property resources in important ways. An incumbent has a strategic incentive to manipulate the resource stock to deter entry or to harvest more stock prior to entry rather than share the resource with the entrant. It is possible that the threat of potential entry can lead to the extinction of the resource even though actual competition would result in a steady state with a positive stock level.
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Mason, C.F., Polasky, S. Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach. Environmental and Resource Economics 23, 255–278 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021288205689
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021288205689