Philosophical Studies

, Volume 111, Issue 1, pp 1–41 | Cite as

Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations

  • David Braun
  • Jennifer Saul
Article

Abstract

Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) isfalse, though they know that (iii) is true. (i) Superman leaps more tallbuildings than Clark Kent. (ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings thanSuperman. (iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent. Semanticexplanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differin truth-value. Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that theintuitions are due to misleading implicatures. This paper argues thatboth explanations are incorrect. (i) and (ii) cannot differ intruth-value, yet the intuitions are not due to implicatures, but ratherto mistakes in evaluating (i) and (ii).

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Braun
    • 1
  • Jennifer Saul
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RochesterRochesterUSA
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SheffieldSheffieldUK

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