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Organizing Economic Experiments: Property Rights and Firm Organization

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Abstract

Many economists, notably Austrian economists, have argued that the market process is essentially an experimental process. We briefly try to clarify this conceptualization, and then argue that we may understand the firm in much the same light. A basic view of the firm as an experimental entity is derived, drawing on property rights insights.

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  1. LINK, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjergvej 3, 3rd floor, 2000, Frederiksberg, Denmark

    Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss

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  1. Kirsten Foss
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Foss, K., Foss, N.J. Organizing Economic Experiments: Property Rights and Firm Organization. The Review of Austrian Economics 15, 297–312 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021162220065

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