Abstract
This reply addresses the issues raised byDougherty in response to my 1999 article in this journal. Ialso develop a new graphical model of the optimal collectionrate under the Articles, where states made contributions, andcontrast it to the revenue potential from direct taxation. Ibelieve that despite Dougherty's criticisms, my argumentremains valid. While the Articles were not perfect in anabsolute sense, that when more properly viewed in acomparative manner, that the system of state contributions forraising revenue under the Articles was (and still is) superiorto a system of direct federal taxation.
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Sobel, R.S. Defending the Articles of Confederation: A Reply to Dougherty. Public Choice 113, 287–299 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020899128933
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020899128933