Abstract
Theories of the size of government focus on either the demandfor government or the supply of tax revenues. Demand sidetheories such as those of Peltzman, Meltzer and Richard,Husted and Kenny, and Lott and Kenny are essentially politicaltheories. They emphasize the role of voters or interest groupsin expanding government. Supply side theories such as those ofKau and Rubin, Baumol, West, and Ferris and West emphasize theability of government to collect taxes. In this paper, wecombine both demand and supply side theories. For demand, weuse the Poole-Rosenthal time series data on the ideology ofCongress, on the theory that all political forces mustultimately express themselves in voting which is measured byideology. For supply, we use the Kau-Rubin measures of theability of government to collect taxes as a function of thedeadweight costs of tax collection and ability of individualsto hide revenues. We find that female labor forceparticipation and the associated ability to tax femaleproductivity is the most important factor associated withgovernment, and it alone explains about 60% of the actualgrowth of government. The ideology of the Senate is alsosignificant, but has a small effect. This paper may be thefirst to examine the influence of ideology on the time path ofa policy; other research examining ideology (including ours)has been cross sectional. Further research on the role ofideology in changing policies over time is clearly warranted.
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Kau, J.B., Rubin, P.H. The Growth of Government: Sources and Limits. Public Choice 113, 389–402 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020884121375
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020884121375