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Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants

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Abstract

This article considers a rent-seeking model with N asymmetriccontestants. Each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent. Oneof the N contestants is selected as the winner based onTullock's probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Information and Operations Management, Texas A&M University College Station, TX, 77843-4217, USA

    William E. Stein

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  1. William E. Stein
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Stein, W.E. Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants. Public Choice 113, 325–336 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020877410243

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020877410243

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