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Brent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Public Administration, School of Public Affairs, American University, Washington, DC, 20016, U.S.A.

    Laura Langbein

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  1. Laura Langbein
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Langbein, L. Brent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again . Public Choice 113, 495–499 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020833907445

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020833907445

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