Abstract
President Roosevelt's attempt to add asmany as six additional justices to theSupreme Court through his infamous``court-packing plan'' of 1937 has long beenheralded as a misuse of presidential powerthat nearly undermined the integrity of ourconstitutional system. Using an analyticnarrative framework, we offer analternative theoretical account of theevents and argue that Roosevelt used theproposal to obtain his immediate goal: ashift in policy direction of the Court. Our framework is supported with historicalevidence, suggesting that all of the actorswere acting rationally by attempting tomaximize their payoffs.
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Carson, J.L., Kleinerman, B.A. A Switch in Time Saves Nine: Institutions, Strategic Actors, and FDR's Court-Packing Plan. Public Choice 113, 301–324 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020815625514
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020815625514