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Auctions: Research Opportunities in Marketing

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Abstract

Despite growing interest in traditional and Internet auctions, the marketing literature on auctions is sparse. This paper outlines selected aspects of the research opportunity. We provide a brief description of the major auction mechanisms, outline key concepts and results from the economic analysis of auctions, and summarize the key findings in empirical tests of auction theory. We then identify areas for future research on auction markets, particularly those of interest to marketers in the new contexts created by the Internet.

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Correspondence to Dipankar Chakravarti.

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Chakravarti, D., Greenleaf, E., Sinha, A. et al. Auctions: Research Opportunities in Marketing. Marketing Letters 13, 281–296 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020399513113

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