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Goldman on Probabilistic Inference

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Abstract

In his recent book, Knowledge in a SocialWorld, Alvin Goldman claims to haveestablished that if a reasoner starts withaccurate estimates of the reliability of newevidence and conditionalizes on thisevidence, then this reasoner is objectively likely to end up closer to thetruth. In this paper, I argue that Goldman'sresult is not nearly as philosophicallysignificant as he would have us believe. First, accurately estimating the reliability ofevidence – in the sense that Goldman requires –is not quite as easy as it might sound. Second, being objectively likely to end upcloser to the truth – in the sense that Goldmanestablishes – is not quite as valuable as itmight sound.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Resources, University of Arizona, USA

    Don Fallis

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  1. Don Fallis
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Fallis, D. Goldman on Probabilistic Inference. Philosophical Studies 109, 223–240 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019644929122

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019644929122

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