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Balashov on special relativity, coexistence, and temporal parts

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Abstract

Yuri Balashov has argued that endurantism isuntenable in the context of Minkowskispacetime. Balashov's argument runs through twomain theses concerning the relation ofcoexistence, or temporal co-location. (1)Coexistence must turn out to be an absolute or objective matter; and inMinkowski spacetime coexistence must begrounded in the relation of spacelikeseparation. (2) If endurantism is true, then(1) leads to absurd conclusions; but ifperdurantism is true, then (1) is harmless. Iobject to both theses. Against (1), I arguethat coexistence is better construed as beingrelative to a hyperplane of simultaneity.Against (2), I argue that the consequences of(1) given endurantism are no worse than theconsequences of (1) given perdurantism.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Albuquerque, USA

    Cody S. Gilmore

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  1. Cody S. Gilmore
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Gilmore, C.S. Balashov on special relativity, coexistence, and temporal parts. Philosophical Studies 109, 241–263 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019629628465

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