Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Joseph LaPorte in an article on `Kind and Rigidity'(Philosophical Studies, Volume 97) resurrects an oldsolution to the problem of how to understand the rigidityof kind terms and other general terms. Despite LaPorte'sarguments to the contrary, his solution trivializes thenotion of rigidity when applied to general terms. Hisarguments do lead to an important insight however. Thenotions of rigidity and non-rigidity do not usefullyapply at all to kind or other general terms. Extendingthe notion of rigidity from singular terms such as propernames to general terms such as natural kind terms is amistake.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Abbott, B. (1989): ‘Nondescriptionality and Natural Kind Terms’, Linguistics and Philosophy 12, 269-291.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1979): ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV, 73-122.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burge, T. (1996): ‘Other Bodies’, in A. Pessin and S. Goldberg (eds.), The Twin Earth Chronicles, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donnellan, K. (1983): ‘Kripke and Putnam on Natural Kind Terms’, in C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind, New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. (1999): Language and Reality, 2nd edn., Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1980): Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • LaPorte, J. (2000): ‘Rigidity and Kind’, Philosophical Studies 97, 293-316.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. (1986): On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Macbeth, D. (1995): ‘Names, Natural Kind Terms, and Rigid Designation’, Philosophical Studies 79, 259-281.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga, A. (1977): ‘Actualism and Possible Worlds’, Theoria, 254-287.

  • Putnam, H. (1975): ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. (1981): Reference and Essence, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schwartz, S.P. (1980): ‘Formal Semantics and Natural Kind Terms’, Philosophical Studies 38, 189-198.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Religion, Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York, 14850, USA

    Stephen P. Schwartz

Authors
  1. Stephen P. Schwartz
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Schwartz, S.P. Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte. Philosophical Studies 109, 265–277 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019612524792

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019612524792

Keywords

Search

Navigation