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Relevance sensitive belief structures

  • Samir Chopra
  • Rohit Parikh
Article

Abstract

We propose a new relevance sensitive model for representing and revising belief structures, which relies on a notion of partial language splitting and tolerates some amount of inconsistency while retaining classical logic. The model preserves an agent's ability to answer queries in a coherent way using Belnap's four‐valued logic. Axioms analogous to the AGM axioms hold for this new model. The distinction between implicit and explicit beliefs is represented and psychologically plausible, computationally tractable procedures for query answering and belief base revision are obtained.

Keywords

Belief Revision Belief Base Truth Assignment Belief Structure Relevance Relation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Samir Chopra
  • Rohit Parikh

There are no affiliations available

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