Abstract
A Cournot model with an arbitrary nonlinear demand function and where firms do notobserve their rival's actions directly is shown to allow mistaken beliefs to persist. Thesealter the original equilibrium state and, in a range of beliefs, destroy its stability and createcycles. The dynamics of the Cournot model are therefore fundamentally affected.
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Léonard, D., Nishimura, K. Nonlinear dynamics in the Cournot modelwithout full information. Annals of Operations Research 89, 165–173 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018919522127
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018919522127