Abstract
This paper is an empirical study to the effects of economic outcomes on party choice for the Netherlands. In the first part of the paper we employ a multinomial logit model to examine the links between voters' characteristics and party choice. The results suggest that there are long-run movements in party choice which are unlikely be the result of changing economic outcomes. In the second part, we use time series analysis to determine the effects of economic conditions on short-run and medium-run movements in votes shares. The estimations results provide support for the responsibility hypothesis and for the predictions of the partisan voter model that left-wing (right-wing) parties benefit (suffer) from favourable economic growth prospects.
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Swank, O., Eisinga, R. Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands. Public Choice 101, 195–213 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018393902890
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018393902890