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Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game

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Abstract

Legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent-seeking contest. In civil litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the outcome of the contest. Institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart in other rent-seeking contests. The endogenous decision to participate in the rent-seeking contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case, and the decision by the defendant to defend it. The desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the parameter which describes the legal technology.

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Author notes

  1. Paul Pecorino

    Present address: Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Box 870224, Tuscaloosa, AL, 35487, U.S.A

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996, U.S.A

    Amy Farmer

Authors
  1. Amy Farmer
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  2. Paul Pecorino
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Farmer, A., Pecorino, P. Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game. Public Choice 100, 271–288 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018368124943

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