Abstract
The discussion on an ecological tax reform has as a central element the idea of a double dividend: to get a better environment, a better tax system with less distortions, and therefore more growth and employment with the one and same stroke. Is it a miracle or fata morgana? In Germany, this discussion came to a halt when the country's comparative disadvantages within the globalization process became painfully apparent and the political emphasis shifted towards (still unsuccessful) attempts to social and structural reforms. The article sheds some light on problems which presumably would have occurred if the strategy of the double dividend had been implemented – or which could occur in the future if the occasion arises. It is shown that technical progress could lead to abrupt losses in tax revenues and provoke counter-strategies in the political sector to secure the economic dividend, which are analyzed from welfare economic and political economic perspectives. The findings are that, due to political self-interest, only low tax solutions (in the inelastic part of the marginal abatement cost curve) would be chosen, which implies that the double dividend strategy does not seem to be a politically feasible route to reach strict environmental goals. It is further shown that these tax rates would be near to the maximum revenue rate, and that this would also be the dominant strategy for all politicians irrespective of their individual value-orientation. The conclusion is that theoretically a double dividend policy will be far from a miracle and that the political approach to it will presumably turn it into a fata morgana.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baumol, W.J. and Oates, W.E. (1988). The theory of environmental policy. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bovenberg, A.L. and Goulder, L.H. (1996). Optimal environmental taxation in the presence of other taxes: General equilibrium analyses. American Economic Review 96: 985–1000.
Bovenberg, A.L. and Mooij, R.A. (1994). Environmental levies and distortionary taxation. American Economic Review 94: 1085–1089.
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1980). The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Endres, A. (1994). Umweltökonomie.Eine Einführung. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Endres, A. and Finus, M. (1996). Umweltpolitische Zielbestimmung im Spannungsfeld gesellschaftlicher Interessengruppen: Ökonomische Theorie und Empirie. In H. Siebert (Ed.), Elemente einer rationalen Umweltpolitik.Expertisen zur umweltpolitischen Neuorientierung. Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck): 35–133.
Frey, B.S. (1994). Direct democracy: Politico-economic lessons from Swiss experience. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 84: 338–43.
Görres, A. (1995). Innovationsschübe durch Ökosteuern. Süddeutsche Zeitung. March 25.
Goulder, L.H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide. International Tax and Public Finance 2: 157–183.
Hansjürgens, B. (1995). Zur unterschiedlichen Durchsetzung von Umweltsteuern und Umweltsonderabgaben: Anmerkungen aus dem Blickwinkel der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie. Staatswissenschaft und Staatspraxis 6: 359–388.
Hansmeyer, K.-H. and Schneider, H.K. (1992). Umweltpolitik.Ihre Fortentwicklung unter marktsteuernden Aspekten. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Kirsch, G. (1995). Neue Politische Ökonomie. 3rd. ed., Düsseldorf: Werner.
Kirsch, G. and Mackscheidt, K. (1985). Staatsmann, Demagoge, Amtsinhaber.Eine psychologische Ergänzung der ökonomischen Theorie der Politik. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Mauch, S.P., Iten, R., von Weizsäcker, E.U. and Jesinghaus, J. (1992). Ökologische Steuerreform: Europäische Ebene und Fallbeispiel Schweiz. Chur/Zürich: Rüegger.
Oates, W.E. (1993). Pollution carges as a source of public revenues. In H. Giersch (Ed.), Economic Progress and Environmental Concerns. Berlin: Springer: 135–152.
Olson, M. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Pearce, D.W. and Turner, R.K. (1990). Economics of natural resources and the environment. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Richter, W.F. and Wiegard, W. (1993) Zwanzig Jahre “Neue Finanzwissenschaft”, Teil II: Steuern und Staatsverschuldung. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften 113: 337–400.
Ruocco, A. and Wiegard, W. (1997). Green tax reforms: Understanding the double dividend hypothesis. Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und Umweltrecht 19: 171–198.
Schöb, R. (1995). Zur Bedeutung des Ökosteueraufkommens: Die Double-Dividend-Hypothese. Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwissenschaften 115: 93–117.
Steenblock, R., Fischer, A., Heyne, K., Hustedt, M., Scheel, C. and Schmidt, A. (1995). Eckpunkte für den Einstieg in eine ökologisch-soziale Steurerreform. Bonn: Parliamentary group “Bündnis 90/Die Grünen”.
Wilson, J.Q. (1980). The politics of regulation. New York: Basic Books.
Zimmerman, K.W. and Schwarze, R. (1996). Industrielobbying bei einer Weitzmanschen Umweltpolitik. Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 47: 79–102.
Zimmermann, H. (1996), Öko-Steuern: Ansätze und Probleme einer “Ökologischen Steuerreform”. In H. Siebert (Ed.), Elemente einer rationalen Umweltpolitik.Expertisen zur umweltpolitischen Neuorientierung, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck): 239–284.
Zimmermann, H. (1994). The revenue effect of environmental charges. Zeitschrift für Angewandte Umweltforschung 7: 26–36.
Zimmermann, K.W. (1995). Verteilung und Umweltschutz. In M. Junkernheinrich, P. Klemmer and G.R. Wagner (Eds.), Handbuch zur Umweltökonomie. Berlin: Analytica: 362–366.
Zimmermann, K.W. and Zirkmann, E. (1997). Small is beautiful. Das technologische Dilemma der Ökosteuer. Zeitschrift für Angewandte Umweltforschung 10: 21–32.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Zimmermann, K.W., Gaynor, J.D. The double dividend: Miracle or fata morgana?. Public Choice 101, 39–58 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018309003234
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018309003234