Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 143–168 | Cite as

The Modal Logic of Discrepancy

  • Charles B. Cross
Article

Abstract

Discrepancies between an agent’s goals and beliefs play an important, if implicit, role in determining what a rational agent is motivated to do. This is most obvious in cases where an agent achieves a complex goal incrementally and must deliberate anew as each milestone is reached. In such cases the concept of goal/belief discrepancy defines an appropriate space to which a degree-of-achievement yardstick can be applied. This paper presents soundness and completeness results concerning a logic for reasoning about goal/belief discrepancy, and it is suggested that a certain species of goal/belief discrepancy captures the concept of desire.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles B. Cross
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GeorgiaAthensU.S.A.

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